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Why Don’t Households Smooth Consumption?  
Evidence from a $25 Million Experiment†
By Jonathan A. Parker*
This paper evaluates theoretical explanations for the propensity of 
households to increase spending in response to the arrival of predict-
able, lump-sum payments, using households in the Nielsen Consumer 
Panel who received $25 million in randomly distributed stimulus pay-
ments. The pattern of spending is inconsistent with models in which 
identical households cycle rapidly through high and low- response 
states as they manage liquidity, but is instead highly predictable by 
income years before the payment. Spending responses are unrelated 
to expectation errors, almost unrelated to crude measures of pro-
crastination and self-control, significantly related to sophistication 
and planning, and highly related to impatience. (JEL  D12, D14, 
D91, E21, H23)
The canonical assumption that the benefits of additional consumption decline with the level of consumption—that marginal utility is diminishing—implies 
that people should manage liquidity to stabilize their consumption over time. While 
many issues complicate testing, this proposition of consumption smoothing has 
been frequently rejected: on average, predictable changes in household income or 
liquidity cause significant changes in household spending, with the largest spending 
effects for households with low liquid wealth or low income.1 This paper investi-
gates why.
One possibility is that illiquidity and lack of consumption smoothing are purely 
the result of poor income shocks or temporary portfolio illiquidity, as in the textbook 
1 Most studies examine increases in liquidity caused by predictable increases in income (Zeldes 1989a; Shapiro 
and Slemrod 1995; Parker 1999; Souleles 1999; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006; Stephens 2003; Jappelli and 
Pistaferri 2014). Other studies have studied increases in liquidity caused by predictable increases in spending costs 
(Souleles 2000), changes in credit constraints (Gross and Souleles 2002, Ludvigson 1999), or predictable decreases 
in loan payments (Stephens 2008; Di Maggio, Kermani, and Ramcharan 2015; Keys et al. 2014). 
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buffer-stock model or life-cycle/permanent-income model (LCPIH) with  borrowing 
constraints (e.g., Zeldes 1989b, Deaton 1991, and Carroll 1997). Similar predictions 
follow from a model in which households have costly access to high-return, rela-
tively illiquid savings vehicles (e.g., Kaplan and Violante 2014). When preferences 
are homogeneous, lack of consumption smoothing is entirely due to temporarily low 
liquidity.
An alternative hypothesis is that low liquidity and lack of consumption smoothing 
are persistent household traits, significantly due to preferences or behavioral charac-
teristics rather than being only situational. The most straightforward version of such 
a theory is that some households are highly impatient or hand-to-mouth households 
as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Hurst (2003). 
Other theories motivated by evidence from laboratory experiments and neurological 
studies characterize lack of consumption smoothing as due to the limits of human 
reasoning or the complexity of human motivation in economic behaviors. As exam-
ples, lack of consumption smoothing may be due to limited attention, limited plan-
ning, reliance on heuristics, or problems of self-control (e.g., Caballero 1995; Reis 
2006; Lusardi 1999; Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2003; Angeletos et al. 2001; Gul 
and Pesendorfer 2004a,b). While according to the homogeneous-agent model, some 
people are unable to smooth consumption due to temporarily low liquid wealth, 
according to these alternatives, some people choose not to smooth consumption and 
not to accumulate liquid wealth due to persistent behavioral characteristics.
This paper studies why household spending responds to liquidity using a set-
ting in which lack of consumption smoothing has already been documented (Broda 
and Parker 2014): a natural field experiment provided by disbursement of the fed-
eral economic stimulus payments of 2008. Using data from a specially designed 
survey of households that are reporting spending in the Nielsen Consumer Panel 
(NCP, formerly the Homescan Consumer Panel), I find evidence that the spending 
response of a household to the arrival of a payment is related to household income 
two-years prior to the experiment, consistent with the behavior being caused by 
persistent characteristics (like preferences) rather than solely by temporarily low 
income. What characteristics? Spending responses to liquidity in this experiment 
are not significantly associated with expectations errors (misestimation of payment 
amount), or with measures of procrastination or lack of self-control. Instead, lack of 
consumption smoothing is associated with a measure of impatience, a measure of 
lack of financial planning, and some measures of lack of frictionless optimization 
in other dimensions.
I measure the degree of consumption smoothing from the response of a house-
hold’s spending to the receipt of an economic stimulus payment using near-random 
variation in the timing of receipt.2 Among households receiving stimulus payments 
by check and among those receiving payments by direct deposit, the week in which 
the payment was disbursed was determined by the last two digits of the recipient’s 
social security number, digits which are effectively randomly assigned. Following 
2 Following the methodology of Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006), this approach has also been used to study 
these and other rebates by Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007); Parker et al. (2013); Broda and Parker (2014), and 
other outcomes by Bertrand and Morse (2009); and Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014). 
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previous research, I compare the spending patterns of households who receive their 
payments at different times. Because the timing of the payment is randomly set by 
the government and is unrelated to a household’s characteristics or economic situa-
tion, this comparison measures the increase in spending caused by receipt. Because 
the variation in timing is uncorrelated with household characteristics, comparing 
differences in spending responses across households with different characteristics 
measures how spending responses to liquidity differ by household characteristic.
The NCP data contain daily information on each household’s purchases of 
household items as well as annual demographic information such as family size 
and income. In conjunction with Nielsen, a multi-wave survey was designed early 
in 2008 and then fielded while the stimulus payments were being disbursed in 2008. 
The survey, administered by email and web for households with web access at home 
and by mail and barcode scanner for households without, collected information on 
the arrival and amount of the first stimulus payment received in order to measure the 
spending response to the payment, and on the liquid wealth, behaviors, and expec-
tations of households in order to relate these characteristics to the failure to smooth 
consumption spending. After dropping households that did not receive payments or 
did not report valid payments, the supplemental survey measures the spending of 
more than 25 thousand NCP households in 2008 as they receive more than $25 mil-
lion in randomly timed stimulus payments.
On average, the spending of households that receive their payments earlier rises 
relative to the spending of households that receive their payments later.3 If spending 
responses were similar across households, then cross-sectional data on household 
responses would tell us little about behavioral models. In fact, consistent with pre-
vious research, the majority of the average spending response is due to households 
with low liquidity, who spend at a rate three to four times that of liquid households 
on arrival. Thus, for any characteristic to be the cause of spending responses, it 
must exhibit variation across households. And this variation must be correlated with 
liquidity in order to explain a substantial share of the average spending response. 
The main findings, summarized in Table 11 in the concluding section, are as follows.
The first main result is that, while low liquidity is a strong predictor of large spend-
ing responses, this does not appear to be due to current poor income shocks but 
rather is a persistent characteristic of low-income households lasting years. If shocks 
to income cause low liquid wealth and failure to smooth spending, then declines in 
income ought to be correlated with spending responses. But households with low 
income growth are no more likely to spend the payment on arrival than those with 
high income growth. And while it is the case that low income in 2008 is associated 
with high rates of spending from payments, income in 2006 is as good as income in 
2008, and as liquidity in 2008, at distinguishing households who spend from those 
who do not. In fact, low 2006 income predicts spending responses even conditional 
on liquidity. Thus, the propensity to spend out of liquidity persists across years.
3 Specifically, the average household raises its spending on NCP-measured household goods by around 13 dol-
lars, roughly 9 percent of the average weekly spending, or about 1.4 percent of the average payment in the week of 
receipt, all highly statistically significant, and by 30 dollars, 2.5 to 3 percent of spending, or roughly 2.5 percent of 
the payment cumulative over the first 7 weeks. In addition to the earlier cited papers, the spending responses are also 
estimated by the US Department of Labor (2017); and Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010). 
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Second, the analysis rejects models that generate spending responses through 
beliefs about the payments. Few households were surprised to get payments, and 
there is little evidence of a larger spending effect of arrival for those who were 
positively surprised by their payments. In one of two specifications, there is a statis-
tically higher spending response for households who were surprised, but this higher 
spending response occurs whether the surprise is positive or negative. Thus, the 
spending response did not occur because many households, particularly low liquid-
ity households, were surprised by their payments. Instead, the evidence is suggestive 
of a link between consumption smoothing and economic abilities or planning as 
revealed by understanding the stimulus payment program.
Third, and related, the data provide evidence consistent with lack of planning 
causing violations of consumption smoothing, as in Reis (2006). Households that 
have not made financial plans do not smooth spending across arrival of the payment, 
while households that have made financial plans smooth consumption well. I also 
find that optimal allocation over time (relative to a frictionless baseline) is related to 
optimal allocation across goods. Households that typically use more deals or specials 
do a better job of smoothing spending the week of arrival than those that do not. This 
is particularly true for households with low liquidity, consistent with households 
differing in the degree to which they plan or optimize economic resources, with 
“inattentive” households having low liquidity, low incomes, and a high propensity to 
spend out of liquidity. However, there is little evidence that variation in optimization 
or planning is a personality trait that crosses decision-making domains. Even house-
holds that report that they plan a great deal for vacations (22 percent of households) 
increase spending significantly during the month following arrival (although they do 
smooth spending reasonably well the week of arrival).
The fourth main finding is that the majority of lack of consumption smoothing is 
predicted by a simple measure that can be interpreted as impatience. Consumption 
smoothing is highly correlated with whether a household reports being the sort of 
people who would rather spend their money and enjoy today rather than save more 
for the future. Households that report being “savers” smooth consumption; house-
holds that report being “spenders” do not. Not surprisingly, being a saver is also 
highly correlated with the level of liquid wealth, so that the type of person is an 
important predictor of both low wealth and lack of consumption smoothing. And the 
type of people who are spenders are worse at consumption smoothing even among 
households with low liquidity.
Finally, the spending response is unrelated to two measures of problems of 
self-control and procrastination. First, the 5 percent of the sample that frequently 
regrets past purchases has an economically large (but statistically weak) spending 
response to payment arrival. But this does not explain much of the average spending 
response. The other 95 percent of the population still exhibits substantial violations 
of consumption smoothing. Second, to analyze procrastination, I sort households by 
their delay in responding to the supplemental survey. This procrastination measure 
is unrelated to the size of spending response.
These findings have several implications for the modeling of consumption and 
saving behavior. First, these results reject models that generate the average spending 
response through surprise at the arrival of these payments. Second, in any model 
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in which the high-spending responses are situational and occur among otherwise 
homogeneous populations due to low liquidity, the low liquidity state has to be 
highly persistent year to year. Third, some households frequently regret purchases 
and poorly smooth spending, but the small share of such households implies that 
this can account for only a small fraction of the average spending response to arrival.
Turning to the main correlates of spending response besides liquidity, both lack 
of financial planning and spending-type households are strongly correlated with 
liquidity and have limited predictive power for spending responses conditional on 
liquidity. This evidence is consistent with low liquidity directly causing  high spend-
ing responses or with low liquidity being merely a symptom of these behaviors 
which themselves directly cause  high spending responses. An example of the former 
is a model with financial frictions in which some households have high levels of 
impatience and face some costs of planning or optimization. Alternatively, the costs 
of optimization or behavioral characteristics could be central, causing some house-
holds to have low incomes, hold little liquidity, not use coupons or deals, fail to plan, 
and spend income when it arrives.
Further, low income is highly correlated both with spending responses and with 
liquidity, but also has significant predictive power beyond liquidity. If planning costs 
are negatively correlated with permanent income, then the Reis (2006) model of 
information processing frictions would generate these patterns.4
Finally, there is some limited evidence that both the propensity to regret pur-
chases and the misunderstanding of payment amount is correlated with spending 
response. Both behaviors have little correlation with low liquidity and so, while 
they do not explain the majority of the spending response, they do suggest that some 
consumer behavior is driven by factors that do not operate through liquidity.
In interpreting these results, a number of caveats are in order. First, these esti-
mates pertain to spending rather than consumption, and only over a one-month 
period that is precisely measured. Second, the measured relationship between 
spending response and characteristics would be distorted by different propensities to 
report spending caused by arrival across characteristics or by different propensities 
to increase spending caused by arrival on non-measured goods and services. Third, 
these results may or may not generalize to other domains of consumption smoothing 
or other populations. For example, incorrect expectations may be a more important 
determinant of spending responses for less publicized payments. Similarly, much 
larger or much smaller payments, may lead to different responses. However, (and 
not a caveat), Broda and Parker (2014) find no noticeable spending response when 
households learned about their payments.
4 Provided that households react to cash flow due to not “absorbing and processing information” despite acquir-
ing it. Similarly, Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001); Hurst (2003); Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003); and 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) present evidence that differences in wealth across households are not well captured 
by behavior in the standard model even with financial frictions but are instead consistent with some features of 
models of behavior incorporating rules of thumb, mental accounts, problems with self-control, or an important role 
for planning. Similar evidence on saving behaviors is provided by Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009); and Chetty 
et al. (2014). 
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I. Sample of Households: The Nielsen Consumer Panel
The subjects for this study are a subset of the households in the 2008 NCP. The 
NCP is a panel survey of US households in 52 metropolitan areas that measures 
demographic characteristics, annual income, and daily spending on household goods. 
Households report spending using barcode scanners and keypads at the conclusion 
of every shopping trip for household goods.5 Household goods include primarily 
grocery, drugstore, and mass-merchandise sectors, and so the recorded expenditures 
primarily cover goods such as food and drug products, small appliances and elec-
tronic goods, and some mass-merchandise products excluding apparel. Participants 
get newsletters and personalized tips and reminders via email and/or mail to upload 
spending information and to answer occasional surveys. For regularly uploading 
information, participants are entered in prize drawings and receive Nielsen points 
that can be accumulated and used to purchase prizes or gifts from a catalogue.
Participants are surveyed when they initially join the survey and at the end of 
each subsequent calendar year about their demographic characteristics, and these 
answers are used as the demographic information for the following calendar year. 
Low-performing households are dropped, and about 80 percent of Nielsen house-
holds are retained from year to year. Nielsen seeks to maintain a panel that is repre-
sentative of the US population, and produces sampling weights that can be used to 
make the sample representative of the US population along ten demographic dimen-
sions (including income). These weights are used throughout the analysis.
While the NCP is limited in the scope of spending that it covers, it has numerous 
benefits for the purpose at hand. First, while I primarily use information on the total 
trip spending rather than the large amount of detail available on products (approx-
imately 700,000 different goods are purchased at some point by households in the 
sample), the use of scanners and receipts in real time increases the accuracy of 
reported expenditures. The temporal precision allows analysis of weekly spending 
responses, which increases the statistical power of the analysis given that the stim-
ulus payments were randomized across weeks. Second, the NCP is relatively large: 
there are around 60,000 active households (of the roughly 120,000 households in 
the panel at any point in 2008) that meet the static reporting requirement used by 
Nielsen to define participating households for the period of January to April 2008. 
Finally, Nielsen has in place a system to survey the households in the NCP. Nielsen 
typically uses these supplemental surveys to conduct marketing studies for corpo-
rate clients, conducting the surveys, analyzing the results, and delivering complete 
analyses to clients.
Christian Broda and I worked with Nielsen in March and April of 2008 to write 
and conduct a survey of the NCP households about both their characteristics and their 
receipt of economic stimulus payments. The next section describes these payments, 
and the following section describes the supplemental survey. The data employed 
in this study are a combination of the responses to this supplemental  survey, data 
5 Households also scan individual items, enter a price if Nielsen does not already have it, and report whether 
they used any coupons or deals. For more details on the NCP, see Broda and Weinstein (2010). 
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licensed from Nielsen, and data available through the Kilts-Nielsen Data Center at 
the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.6
II. The 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments
Following Parker et al. (2013) and Broda and Parker (2014), I estimate the effect of 
liquidity on spending from the random variation in liquidity provided by the Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008. The act called for $100 billion in economic stimulus payments 
to be disbursed to about 130 million eligible taxpayers. Because it was not admin-
istratively possible for the IRS to mail all stimulus checks or letters accompanying 
direct deposits at once, within each method of disbursement, the week in which the 
payment was disbursed was determined by the last two digits of the recipient’s social 
security number, digits which are effectively randomly assigned.7 For recipients that 
did not provide a personal bank routing number, the payments were mailed (using 
paper checks) in one of nine one-week periods ranging from the middle of May to 
the middle of July.8 The IRS sent a notification letter one week before the check was 
mailed. For recipients that provided the IRS with their personal bank routing num-
ber, the stimulus payments were disbursed electronically over three one-week periods 
ranging from late April to the middle of May.9 The IRS mailed a statement to each 
household informing it about the deposit, sent to arrive a few business days before the 
electronic transfer of funds.10 Table 1 shows the schedule of payment disbursements.
In terms of amount, each payment consisted of a basic payment and an additional 
payment of $300 per child that qualified for the child tax credit in 2007. The basic 
payment was generally the maximum of $300 ($600 for couples filing jointly) and 
a taxpayer’s 2007 tax liability up to $600 ($1,200 for couples). Households without 
tax liability received basic payments of $300 ($600 for couples), so long as they 
had at least $3,000 of qualifying 2007 income. The stimulus payment amount was 
reduced by 5 percent of the amount by which adjusted gross income exceeded a 
threshold of $75,000 for individuals and $150,000 for couples. Thus, payments were 
not received by high-income households who earned enough to reduce their pay-
ments to zero nor by low-income households who had neither positive tax liability 
nor sufficient qualifying income.
III. The NCP Supplemental Survey
To measure the payments received by NCP households, a supplemental survey was 
administered to the households in the NCP. This survey consists of two parts, each 
6 Data are available at: http://research.chicagobooth.edu/nielsen/. 
7 The last four digits of a social security number (SSN) are assigned sequentially to applicants within geo-
graphic areas (which determine the first three digits of the SSN) and a “group” (the middle two digits of the SSN). 
8 For late filers, if it was not possible to distribute the payment in the week proscribed by their SSN then it was 
distributed as soon after as possible. 
9 The payment was mailed for any tax return for which the IRS had only the tax preparers routing number, as for 
example would occur as part of taking out a refund anticipation loan. 
10 Banks were notified a couple of days before the date of funds transfer, and some banks showed the amount 
on the beneficiary’s bank account a day or more before the actual credit date. There were reports of banks crediting 
accounts on Friday, April 25 for payments that were to be deposited on Monday, April 28. 
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to be answered by “the adult most knowledgeable about your household’s income 
tax returns.” The survey only measures the first payment received by a household, 
or if more than one was received, the household was instructed to report the larger. 
Part I of the survey contains questions pertaining to the household’s liquid assets 
and behaviors related to planning, spending, and self-control. Part II first describes 
the program of economic stimulus payments and then asks, “Has your household 
received a tax rebate (stimulus payment) this year?” Households that respond posi-
tively are subsequently asked about the amount and date of arrival of their stimulus 
payment, whether it was received by check or direct deposit, the extent to which the 
amount was expected, whether the household mostly saved or spent the stimulus 
payment, and the amount of spending across categories of goods.
The survey was fielded in multiple waves, with each wave following the standard 
procedures that Nielsen uses to survey the consumer panel households. For house-
holds with internet access and who were in communication with Nielsen by email, 
the survey was administered in three waves in a web-based form, and for households 
without access and in contact with Nielsen by regular mail, the survey was adminis-
tered in only two waves in a paper/barcode scanner form, since the distribution time 
was slower and the preparation time greater. Repeated surveying was conditioned 
on earlier responses.11 The surveys covered the main period during which payments 
were distributed with random timing. A supplementary online Appendix gives the 
11 Households completing Part I of the survey (household characteristics) in any wave were not asked Part I 
again. Households reporting payment information in Part II were not resurveyed, so I measure only the first pay-
ment received by any household. Households that responded to the first question on Part II that they don’t know 
whether they had received a stimulus payment, that they have not received one and “expect to,” or respond that 
they “are unsure whether I will get any” do not proceed to Part II and are resurveyed with Part II in a later wave (if 
Table 1—The Timing of the Economic Stimulus Payments
Panel A. Payments by transfer  
of electronic funds
Panel B. Payments by  
paper check
Last two digits 
of taxpayer 
SSN
Date by which 
payment funds 
are deposited 
Last two digits 
of taxpayer 
SSN
Date by which 
payment check 
is in mail
00 –20 May 2 00 –09 May 16
21–75 May 9 10 –18 May 23
76 –99 May 16 19–25 May 30
26 –38 June 6
39–51 June 13
52–63 June 20
64–75 June 27
76 –87 July 4
88–99 July 11
Source: Internal Revenue Service (2008)
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timing of the surveys, the invitations and reminders, survey, response rates, and 
information about data access.
The repeated nature of the survey implies that the recall window for the payment 
is relatively short: one month for the email/web survey when it is first fielded and 
just over one and a half months for the mail/scanner survey when it first arrives. 
The survey was administered to all households meeting a Nielsen static reporting 
requirement for January through April 2008, which amounted to 46,620 households 
by email/web and 13,243 by mail/barcode scanner. For both types of survey, the 
response rates were 72 percent to the first wave, and 80 percent after all waves, giv-
ing 48,409 survey responses (of which some are invalid for various reasons).
To proceed, I drop all households from the analysis that: do not report receiving 
a payment (roughly 20 percent of the respondents); do not report a date of payment 
receipt; report not having received a payment in one survey and then later report 
receiving a payment prior to their response to the earlier in a later survey; report 
receiving a payment after the date they submitted the survey; report receiving a pay-
ment by direct deposit (by mail) outside the period of the randomized disbursement 
by direct deposit (mail); and do not report means of receipt but report receiving a 
payment outside both periods of randomized disbursement.12 These cuts reduce the 
sample to 28,937 households reporting receiving a total of over 26 million dollars in 
payments. These households are merged with the information on total spending on 
each trip taken by each household during 2008 from the Kilts NCP, which includes 
only households that meet the Nielsen static reporting requirement for 2008. These 
data are collapsed down to spending per week per household.
This sample selection is not random. It is, however, (presumably) uncorrelated 
with the randomization, and so creates no bias for estimation of the average treat-
ment effect in the remaining sample. But it is important to note that given hetero-
geneity in treatment effect, nonrandom sample attrition may create bias if there are 
differences in treatment effects between households dropped from the sample and 
households that are included. It is also true that there is selection involved in which 
households are recruited and participate in the NCP survey.
Average (weighted) weekly spending in the baseline, static sample is $149. The 
spending of households receiving payments by mail is $16 less than that of house-
holds receiving a payment by direct deposit. The supplemental survey seems to 
provide an accurate measure of payment and payment receipt. The average pay-
ment conditional on receiving one is $898. Households receiving payments by 
direct deposit on average have higher payments by about $190, which is reasonably 
consistent with their having on average 0.4 members more in these households.13 
As was true for the actual disbursements, most reported payments are clustered at 
 a multiple of $300.14 These features of the distributions line up well with those 
there is one). Finally, households that respond, “No, and I am definitely not getting one,” do not proceed and are 
not resurveyed. 
12 I allow a two-day grace period for reporting relative to survey submit dates, and a seven-day grace period 
for misreporting relative to the period of randomization. I do not adjust the reported date of receipt in either case. 
13 Recall that each additional child eligible for the child tax credit leads to a $300 larger payment, while a mar-
ried couple receives $600 more than the equivalent family with an unmarried head. 
14 Households in the mail survey were prompted by the example of $600 as part of reminding them how to enter 
a dollar amount on their barcode scanner. There was no amount prompt in the online survey. 
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in  similar surveys conducted by the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) (see Parker et al. 2013). More 
details and tables of summary statistics are provided in the online Appendix.
IV. Estimation Methodology
The question of interest is which households respond more and less strongly to 
payment arrival. Thus, rather than estimate the dollars spent on arrival or the per-
cent increase in spending, I measure the spending response in terms of the share of 
payment spent. Specifically, I use the following specification to examine the average 
impact of the receipt of a payment on spending for household  i with characteristic  j 
in week  t receiving a payment by method  m :
(1)  C i, t =  μ i +  ∑ 
s=−L
 
S
  β s, j ES P i, t−s +  τ m, j, t +  η i, t ,
where  C i, t is the dollar amount of NCP spending by household  i in week  t ;  μ i is a 
household-specific intercept that captures differences in the average level of spend-
ing across households;  ES P i, t is zero when a payment is not received and is the 
average amount received for that type of household by that method of disbursement 
(mail or direct deposit) when the household gets their payment;  τ m, j, t is a set of (regression coefficients on) indicator variables for every week in the sample for 
each type of household for each method of disbursement; and finally,  η i, t captures 
all expenditures unexplained by the previous factors. The parameters of interest are 
the  β s, j which importantly differ by type of household  j . The  β s, j measure, for each 
type of household, the marginal propensity to spend out of a payment before arrival 
(up to  L leads), the week of arrival, and following arrival (up to the largest possible 
lag,  S ). These effects are identified by the restriction that  β s, j = 0 for all  s, <− L .
Because there are time effects interacted with type  j and means of receipt, dif-
ferences in the impact of aggregate changes or difference in seasonal spending 
between recipients with different characteristics or means of disbursement do not 
bias the estimated  β s, j . That said, this specification is demanding of the data, so I 
also report results with a complete set of time dummies interacted only with house-
hold type and not with means of receipt (and where the average payment amount for 
 ES P i, t is measured separately over  j but not  m ).
Finally, identification of the key parameters of interest for a type  j does not require 
that households are similar, or unselected, across types. Consistency requires that 
the variation in  ES P i, t be uncorrelated with all other factors that might influence 
household expenditure besides the receipt-driven variation of interest. Selection into 
type  j —or more generally, correlation of type and average treatment effect—does 
not bias estimates of average effects within type. In fact, differences in average 
treatment effect are the main issues of interest. But it is important to note that selec-
tion into the NCP and/or selective attrition out of our sample ex ante or over time 
could bias population inference of differences in average treatment effects across 
household types if correlated with treatment effect. For example, suppose that the 
extent of consumption smoothing were uncorrelated with wealth across households 
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in the population. If low-wealth households that smooth consumption well did not 
respond to our survey and everyone else did, then we would observe in our sam-
ple that  low-wealth households smooth consumption more poorly than high-wealth 
households. But this would be true only for our sample and not the population.
In estimation, standard errors are adjusted to allow for arbitrary heteroskedastic-
ity and within-household serial correlations.
V. The Baseline Result: The Average Response of Spending and the Importance of 
Liquidity
Before analyzing differences in responses across household types, I present the 
existing results (e.g., Broda and Parker 2014) that, first, there is a significant increase 
in spending caused by the receipt of a payment on average across all households 
(only one type  j ), and second, the majority of this increase is due to households with 
low levels of liquid wealth. Table 2 displays results from the estimation of equa-
tion (1) for two specifications each with three leads of ESP: one that uses all varia-
tion in timing of receipt (the first three columns; only one category of  m ), and one 
that treats the two different methods of disbursement as two separate experiments 
(the second three columns).
According to both specifications, households on average spend 1.5 percent of 
the payment the week of arrival (first row, first and fourth columns). This response 
is highly statistically significant. And the cumulative response over four weeks is 
roughly 3.5 percent of the payment, also highly statistically significant.
Table 2—Spending Propensities for All Households and by Liquidity
Using all variation in time  
of receipt 
Using only variation in timing 
within each method of receipt
All 
households
At least two 
months available 
income in liquid 
wealth?
All 
households
At least two 
months available 
income in liquid 
wealth?
Yes No Yes No
Contemporaneous week 1.49 0.63 2.78 1.45 0.66 2.53
(0.25) (0.29) (0.39) (0.29) (0.30) (0.42)
t-stat of “Yes” equals “No” 4.47 3.64
Four-week cumulative increase 3.70 2.04 6.57 3.31 2.08 4.87
(0.70) (0.74) (1.01) (0.46) (1.03) (1.36)
t-stat of “Yes” equals “No” 3.63 1.64
Number of households 21,386 13,685 7,656 21,320 13,654 7,621
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of a pay-
ment in percent. The regressions in the first triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample, and 
the second triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include 
household fixed effects and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only house-
holds that report receipt during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specifi-
cation, and meet the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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These small propensities to spend do not imply small spending responses over-
all because these measures include only spending on goods covered by the NCP 
data. Parker et al. (2013) look at all spending categories in the CEX and find that 
the majority of the payments are spent during the three-month period that includes 
arrival, and that the categories of goods that comprise the majority of the spending 
in the NCP are those that respond the least (e.g., food at home).
As shown in Table D in the online Appendix, there is no rise in spending in the 
three-weeks prior to the arrival of the payment. All coefficients after the fourth week 
are statistically insignificant and economically small. As a result, for the balance of 
the paper, I focus on consumption smoothing on arrival and over the following four 
weeks.
These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. In a specifica-
tion that replaces  ESP with a categorical variable indicating arrival, households on 
average increase their spending by $13 the week of arrival and by $30 cumulatively 
over four weeks. In a specification that additionally replaces the dependent vari-
able with spending relative to the first 12 weeks of the year, households increase 
their spending by just under 10 percent of the average weekly spending the week 
of arrival and roughly 5 percent of spending over four weeks.15 Given the average 
weekly spending of $149 and an average payment of $898, these numbers are con-
sistent with columns 1 and 4 in Table 2.
If the spending response were the same across households, then cross-sectional 
information would be useless for evaluating models of lack of consumption smooth-
ing. Instead, there is significant heterogeneity in spending response across house-
holds correlated with liquidity (e.g., Zeldes 1989a; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 
2006; Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 2007; and in this dataset, Broda and Parker 2014). 
The investigation of liquidity is motivated by models of consumption smoothing with 
financial frictions. If a household either is unable to borrow due to a binding liquidity 
constraint or does not want to borrow due to a high elasticity of precautionary saving 
with respect to cash on hand, then low current or recent income can indicate that a 
household has a higher propensity to spend income on arrival. The main prediction is 
that households with low levels of liquid wealth fail to smooth consumption.
To measure liquidity, Part I of the supplemental survey contains the question, 
“In case of an unexpected decline in income or increase in expenses, do you have 
at least two months of income available in cash, bank accounts, or easily accessible 
funds?” and the respondent can answer yes or no. This measurement instrument 
is motivated by the canonical buffer-stock model (e.g., Carroll 1997), which uses 
scale-invariant preferences and in which liquidity is naturally measured as available 
funds relative to the permanent component of income.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 show that households with low liquidity, which make 
up 36 percent of the sample, spend 2.5 to 2.8 percent of the payment the week of 
15 These results are also displayed in online Appendix Table D. Additionally, similar patterns emerge when 
restricting to households reporting spending in at least half the weeks or in every week, and when trimming the 
top and bottom 1 percent of spending. Similar percentage changes and spending effects relative to average dollar 
spending are found using, as a measure of weekly spending, the more volatile and smaller measure of spending 
constructed as the sum of all individual items purchased instead of the sum of all total trip spending, and using 
households that do not meet the Nielsen static reporting requirement for the year. 
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arrival and 4.9 to 6.6 percent the four weeks of and following arrival. Households 
with sufficient liquid wealth still exhibit a statistically significant increase in  spending 
in response to arrival, but they spend only at one-fourth the rate of households with 
insufficient wealth the week the payment arrives, and one-half to one-third the rate 
over the four weeks of and following arrival.16 This finding is consistent with previ-
ous research and consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints or incomplete 
financial markets: lack of consumption smoothing is concentrated among house-
holds with low liquidity.
VI. Differences in Spending Responses and Models of Spending Responses
The significant heterogeneity in the spending response implies that one can test 
models of consumer behavior by evaluating their ability to explain cross-sectional 
differences in spending responses. If a model of consumer behavior cannot generate 
variation in spending responses across households, or if the determinants or indi-
cators of this variation show no variation in the data, then this model is inconsis-
tent with the finding that some households smooth spending well and some poorly. 
Further, given the large amount of heterogeneity associated with liquid wealth, any 
such determinant that is uncorrelated with liquid wealth will miss a large amount of 
variation in behavior and so is unlikely to be the main reason that households fail to 
smooth consumption.
Plausible theories then must predict variation in consumption smoothing along an 
observable characteristic that is correlated with liquidity. Such a relationship raises 
the question of whether this characteristic causes low liquidity or whether this char-
acteristic is caused by or merely correlated with low liquidity. This paper does not 
observe plausibly exogenous variation in the characteristic or liquidity, and so can-
not distinguish the direction of causation.
A. Heterogeneity in Consumption Smoothing: Transitory State or Persistent 
Characteristic?
In the leading model, lack of consumption smoothing is caused by a series of 
poor income shocks, as in the parametrization of models such as Zeldes (1989b), 
Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1997), or by a transitory low level of liquid assets 
due to fixed costs of portfolio adjustment, as in the model of Kaplan and Violante 
(2014). An alternative is that persistent behavioral traits cause low liquid wealth 
and, either directly or indirectly through low liquidity, cause spending responses. 
This behavioral trait could be impatience, but it could also be due to nonlinearities 
in budget constraints such as caused by means-tested benefit programs.
This subsection shows that lack of consumption smoothing is a characteristic 
that lasts years and is not due to temporarily low or high liquidity that might arise 
for example from management of illiquid wealth, year-end bonuses, tax refunds, 
moderate shocks to spending needs, or insured, short-term job loss. I show that, 
16 Despite the additional set of time dummies interacted with method of receipt in these subsample regressions, 
the sample weighted average of the spending increases are almost exactly equal to the average spending increase. 
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while measured only crudely, recent income growth and consumption smoothing 
are unrelated so that transitory income changes play no measurable role in spending 
responses to the arrival of payments. The level of income in 2008, however, has a 
strong correlation with both liquidity and consumption smoothing. Households with 
low current income smooth consumption poorly while households with high current 
income smooth consumption well. But a similar relationship exists for income in 
2007 and, even more strikingly for income in 2006, two-years prior to the payments. 
This pattern also holds for households with sufficient liquidity and for households 
with low liquidity. Thus, lack of consumption smoothing appears to be a persistent 
characteristic related to low permanent income, and not primarily driven by tran-
sitory and moderate income shocks or costs of accessing illiquid wealth and tem-
porary low liquidity. Finally, there is evidence that lack of consumption smoothing 
is not purely due to low liquidity. Low income in 2006 predicts a larger spending 
response even conditional on liquidity.
Households in the NCP are surveyed about annual income in year t − 2 at the end 
of calendar year t − 1, and this information is reported as household income in the 
year t dataset. Income is reported in 19 income ranges. The ranges are each less than 
or equal to $5,000 for incomes less than $50,000, then rise through the $10,000 and 
$25,000 ranges until the highest 2 ranges are covering an income level of  $150,000 
to $200,000 and $200,000 and above. A household is defined as having an income 
increase if it reports moving to a higher range and a decrease if it reports moving to 
a lower range. 
Panel A in Table 3 shows spending responses for households whose income 
moves to a lower range, stays in the same range, and moves to a higher range from 
2007 to 2008, the year of the payment program. There is no evidence of any differ-
ential spending response across categories of income growth. Panel B repeats this 
exercise for income changes from 2006 to 2007. In panel B, there is no evidence 
that households that have had declines in income spend more of their payments 
on receipt than households whose incomes have stayed in the same range or than 
those whose incomes have increased. In fact, there is some evidence of the reverse; 
household spending responses are increasing in income growth from 2006 to 2007. 
While measurement is not precise, these results on income growth are inconsistent 
with the view that the high-spending response of low-income households is due to 
temporarily low income.17
Panel C of Table 3 splits households into 3 roughly equal groups according to 
2008 income.18 The bottom 36 percent of households by 2008 income—those with 
annual labor incomes of less than $35,000—spend at roughly double the rate of the 
other income groups. The group with the highest 2008 income does not consume 
a statistically significant fraction of the payment in either specification or at either 
horizon. This is inconsistent with the textbook model of liquidity constraints (or 
precautionary saving), in which a household’s temporarily low income leads them 
17 This lack of correlation with spending responses is also found with a measure of temporarily low income 
based on 2007 income relative to surrounding years. 
18 These ranges/choices follow the industry standard, see Zeldes (1989a); Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles 
(1998); Jappelli (1990); and Souleles (1999). 
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Table 3—Spending Responses by Income Growth and Income Group
Using all variation in time  
of receipt 
Using only variation in timing within 
each method of receipt
To lower 
category
Same 
category
To higher 
category
To lower 
category
Same 
category
To higher 
category
Panel A. income growth 2007 to 2008
Contemporaneous 1.35 0.99 1.70 0.85 0.90 1.29
 week (0.57) (0.39) (0.61) (0.64) (0.42) (0.67)
Four-week 4.18 2.45 4.57 1.35 1.84 1.80
 cumulative increase (1.55) (1.05) (1.61) (2.06) (1.46) (2.11)
Number of 3,416 7,719 3,051 3,405 7,696 3,042
 households
Panel B. income growth 2006 to 2007
Contemporaneous 1.19 1.28 1.94 0.88 1.10 1.89
 week (0.65) (0.32) (0.61) (0.64) (0.35) (0.65)
Four-week 2.20 4.01 5.19 0.12 3.28 4.23
 cumulative increase (1.61) (0.86) (1.57) (2.08) (1.19) (2.26)
Number of 3,142 10,051 4,055 3,133 10,023 4,042
 households
Income < 
$35,000
$35,000 ≤ 
income < 
$70,000
$70,000 
≤ income 
Income < 
$35,000
$35,000 ≤ 
income < 
$70,000
$70,000 
≤ income 
Panel C. 2008 income
Contemporaneous 2.46 1.40 0.21 2.06 0.87 0.39
 week (0.58) (0.45) (0.49) (0.64) (0.49) (0.50)
Four-week 3.78 4.01 2.20 2.68 1.07 1.98
 cumulative increase (1.64) (1.16) (1.33) (2.02) (1.46) (1.95)
Number of 5,057 5,303 3,826 5,035 5,289 3,819
 households
Panel D. 2007 income 
Contemporaneous 2.56 1.44 0.71 2.39 1.11 0.65
 times (0.55) (0.40) (0.44) (0.57) (0.44) (0.46)
Four-week 5.35 3.97 3.17 4.85 3.02 1.73
 cumulative increase (1.44) (1.05) (1.19) (1.81) (1.44) (1.71)
Number of 6,067 6,398 4,783 6,049 6,377 4,772
 households
Panel E. 2006 income
Contemporaneous 3.13 1.41 0.56 3.09 1.15 0.59
 week (0.57) (0.34) (0.37) (0.59) (0.37) (0.39)
Four-week 6.99 3.44 1.99 8.13 2.16 1.10
 cumulative increase (1.33) (0.90) (1.02) (1.73) (1.20) (1.42)
Number of 7,495 7,783 6,063 7,466 7,761 6,048
 households
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of a pay-
ment in percent. The regressions in the first triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample and 
the second triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include 
household fixed effects and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only house-
holds that report receipt during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specifi-
cation, and meet the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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to violate consumption smoothing because they are unable to borrow against (or 
insure) future labor income. This same pattern is evident in panel D in which house-
holds are split according to their incomes in 2007.
Most strikingly, the same pattern is observed in panel E using income in 2006. 
Low income in 2006 indicates poor consumption smoothing in 2008, and high 
income in 2006 indicates good consumption smoothing in 2008. In fact, low income 
in 2006 is as good as, if not better than, contemporaneous liquidity (Table 2) at 
separating the households who spent from those who did not. This evidence is at 
odds with models in which either low transitory income or portfolio management 
cause quite temporary low liquidity and large spending responses for some house-
holds, such as the textbook, scale-invariant models of buffer-stock behavior. Rather, 
according to this evidence, households that have low income over several years are 
poor at smoothing consumption.
How does income interact with liquidity in explaining spending responses? 
Table 4, panels A and B, show that 2008 income level is correlated with liquidity: 
45 percent of households with low liquidity have low income in 2008 while 31 per-
cent of households with sufficient liquidity have low income. Panel C and D show 
that this correlation is just as strong between income in 2006 and liquidity in 2008.
Conditional on sufficient liquidity, households with low income in 2006 have sig-
nificant spending responses (panel C) while households with high incomes do not. 
And conditional on low liquidity (panel D), there are statistically significant differ-
ences in the size of the spending response at four weeks between households with 
high incomes in 2006 and those with low incomes. In sum, there is a lot of variation 
in spending response in 2008 across households explained by household income in 
2006, both unconditionally (Table 3, panel E) and conditional on current liquidity 
(Table 4, panels C and D).
B. Beliefs: Are Spending responses Due to Households That Are Surprised by 
Their Payments?
This subsection shows that the households who spent their payments when 
they arrived did not do so because they were not expecting their payments. Most 
households expected the payments; there are significant spending responses 
for those who were expecting their payments, and households that are posi-
tively surprised by their payments spend similarly to those that are negatively 
surprised. The responses of these two groups of surprised households do pro-
vide some weak evidence linking understanding of the stimulus program and 
consumption smoothing: in one of two specifications, spending responses are 
greater for the households that incorrectly understood the payments by not expect-
ing the payment, underestimating the amount, or (primarily) overestimating 
the amount.
One reason that the arrival of a preannounced payment might cause an increase 
in spending is if some households are surprised by the arrival of the payment despite 
available information about the payment. Motivated in part by the findings of excess 
sensitivity, recent modeling of human behavior has considered the costs of gather-
ing and processing information and how economizing on these costs might alter the 
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predictions of the canonical model of consumption and saving (e.g., Caballero 1995, 
Reis 2006, Sims 2003).
While these models need not imply strong spending response to receipt, Reis 
(2006) shows that households with large costs of optimization choose to be “inatten-
tive savers” who follow a saving plan and optimally let consumption track income. 
While these models also have implications for the relationship between measures of 
planning and spending responses, this subsection assesses the role of expectations 
in the spending response. The supplemental survey asked households who reported 
that they received a payment: “Was this about the amount your household was 
expecting?” Households were given the following answers to choose from: “No, 
Table 4—Spending Responses by Liquidity and Income Level
Using all variation in time  
of receipt 
Using only variation in timing within 
each method of receipt
Income < 
$35,000
$35,000 ≤ 
income < 
$70,000
$70,000 
≤ income 
Income < 
$35,000
$35,000 ≤ 
income < 
$70,000
$70,000 
≤ income 
Panel A. Households with sufficient liquid wealth, by 2008 income
Contemporaneous 0.91 0.62 −0.06 1.08 −0.03 0.17
 week (0.76) (0.50) (0.55) (0.82) (0.53) (0.56)
Four-week −0.17 3.55 0.41 0.18 0.89 0.66
 cumulative increase 1.92 (1.44) (1.51) (2.51) (1.76) (2.26)
Number of households 3,068 3,762 2,964 3,055 3,754 2,962
Panel B. Households with low liquid wealth, by 2008 income
Contemporaneous 4.23 2.61 1.21 3.26 2.23 1.20
 week (0.90) (0.84) (1.03) (1.01) (0.95) (1.08)
Four-week 8.41 4.74 8.31 5.77 1.10 6.44
 cumulative increase (2.76) (1.99) (2.86) (3.29) (2.56) (3.66)
Number of households 1,989 1,541 862 1,980 1,535 857
Panel C. Households with sufficient liquid wealth, by 2006 income
Contemporaneous 2.33 0.44 0.06 2.46 0.24 0.21
 week (0.85) (0.41) (0.42) (0.85) (0.43) (0.43)
Four-week 3.79 2.27 1.04 5.45 1.97 0.79
 cumulative increase (1.70) (1.16) (1.19) (2.33) (1.61) (1.60)
Number of households 4,147 5,047 4,491 4,134 5,036 4,484
Panel D. Households with low liquid wealth, by 2006 income
Contemporaneous 3.79 2.60 1.81 3.69 2.23 1.52
 week (0.76) (0.56) (0.75) (0.81) (0.61) (0.81)
Four-week 9.91 5.02 4.45 10.40 2.22 1.53
 cumulative increase (2.01) (1.40) (2.01) (2.53) (1.79) (3.06)
Number of households 3,348 2,736 1,572 3,332 2,725 1,564
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of an ESP in 
percent. The regressions in the first triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample and the sec-
ond triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include house-
hold fixed effects and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households 
that report receipt during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, 
and meet the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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and we were surprised to get any rebate at all,” “No, and it was less than we were 
expecting,” “No, and it was more than we were expecting,” “Yes, and we’ve known 
the approximate amount since February,” “Yes, and we’ve known the approximate 
amount since March,” “Yes, and we’ve known the approximate amount since April,” 
“Yes, but we only learned about it recently,” and “Not sure/dont know.”
Panel A of Table 5 contains the results for three groups of households and shows 
four main results. First, the last row of panel A shows that most households expected 
the payment when it arrived. Only 12 percent of households were positively sur-
prised (columns 2 and 5); 5 percent of households were surprised by the arrival, 
and 7 percent found that it was more than they were expecting. Thirteen percent of 
households found that their payment was less than they expected (columns 3 and 6). 
Second, even those households who had been expecting the payment in the correct 
amount had significant spending responses to the arrival on impact and cumulatively 
Table 5—Spending Responses by Household Expectations and Liquidity
Using all variation in time 
of receipt 
Using only variation in timing within 
each method of receipt
Was this about the 
amount your 
household was 
expecting?:
Yes, 
known 
since 
February, 
March, 
or April
Learned 
more 
recently 
or 
positively 
surprised
No, 
less 
than 
expecting
Yes, 
known 
since 
February, 
March, 
or April
Learned 
more 
recently 
or 
positively 
surprised
No, 
less 
than 
expecting
Panel A. All households
Contemporaneous 1.19 2.37 2.80 1.30 1.68 2.00
 week (0.25) (0.83) (0.73) (0.27) (0.81) (0.81)
Four-week cumulative 3.31 5.13 6.69 3.42 1.91 4.52
(0.67) (1.74) (2.20) (0.93) (2.03) (3.10)
Number of households 15,991 2,525 2,693 15,956 2,505 2,685
Panel B. Households with sufficient liquid wealth
Contemporaneous 0.39 1.07 2.08 0.59 0.43 1.35
 week (0.29) (1.18) (1.13) (0.31) (1.15) (1.24)
Four-week cumulative 1.69 2.61 4.68 2.56 −0.58 1.99
(0.82) (2.08) (3.00) (1.13) (2.58) (4.94)
Number of households 10,603 1,658 1,317 10,586 1,649 1,314
Panel C. Households with low liquid wealth
Contemporaneous 2.41 4.26 3.41 2.39 3.47 2.55
 week (0.46) (1.06) (0.96) (0.50) (1.09) (1.07)
Four-week cumulative 5.89 8.89 8.74 4.51 5.58 6.89
(1.12) (3.03) (3.15) (1.58) (3.32) (3.99)
Number of households 5,388 867 1,376 5,370 856 1,371
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of an ESP 
in percent. The regressions in the first triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample and the 
second triplet include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include household fixed 
effects and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households that report 
receipt during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, and meet 
the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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over four weeks (columns 1 and 4). Third, while few households were positively 
surprised by the payment, there is some statistically weak evidence that this led to a 
higher propensity to spend on impact but no consistent evidence of more spending 
over four weeks.19
Finally, not only is there no decline in spending for households who received pay-
ments that were less than they were expecting, but point estimates suggest that these 
households actually spent at higher rates than the average household. One can reject 
the equality of the contemporaneous spending response between households who 
are expecting the payment (column 1) and those who are negatively surprised (col-
umn 3) (t-statistic 2.08). This is not the case for the four-week response ( t-statistic 
1.47) nor at either horizon in the second set of columns, in which the responses 
across groups are more similar.
Panels B and C split households by liquidity. The mistake of expecting a larger 
than actual payment is more prevalent among households with insufficient funds: 
18  percent of households with low liquid wealth are negatively surprised by the 
amount of their payments while only 10 percent of households with sufficient liq-
uid wealth are. In terms of the estimated coefficients, smaller samples lead to less 
statistical power within each level of liquidity. For households with sufficient liquid 
wealth, where one might expect news to carry the largest effect, there is no evi-
dence of any role for expectations in spending responses. For households with low 
liquid wealth, there is some evidence that those who expected the payment have 
smaller spending responses, but even this is statistically weak (the strongest finding 
is the contemporaneous spending response between columns 1 and 2, which has a 
 t-statistic of 1.60).
In sum, there is no evidence that households spent the payments because they 
were not expecting them. Few households were surprised by the amount of the pay-
ment upon arrival, and there is a strong consumption response among those expect-
ing the payments, and no relationship between the sign of the expectation error and 
the size of the spending response. Instead, these findings suggest that households 
with low levels of economic sophistication or planning as measured by understand-
ing of the stimulus payment program have little ability to smooth consumption. 
More households with low liquidity are negatively surprised by their payments, and 
while statistically weak, these households have the largest propensity to spend on 
arrival despite this negative surprise.
C. Sophistication: Financial Planning; Planners; and use of Deals, Specials,  
and Coupons
This section evaluates whether lack of planning causes violations of consumption 
smoothing. Households that have made financial plans in the last two years smooth 
spending across arrival well. Might the propensity to plan be causing smooth-
ing (and sufficient liquidity)? A small share of households that plan extensively 
for vacation seem to smooth consumption well. But financial planning is far more 
19 The propensity to spend is larger for households surprised by the payment in the first triplet of columns, but 
not in the second triplet in which the distribution by mail and by direct deposit are treated as separate experiments. 
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important than planning for vacation, in that spending responds to payment arrival 
for  households that plan for vacations but not for households that have made finan-
cial plans. Finally, households that make use of specials, deals, or coupons when 
shopping smooth consumption significantly better than those that do not.
Lusardi (1999) theorizes that careful planning—through making better invest-
ment choices and considering the need to save—is a major determinant of wealth 
accumulation for retirement. Further, the paper shows evidence that differences in 
the propensity to plan explain a significant amount of the differences in wealth accu-
mulation observed in the United States. Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) show 
that households who say that they have made a financial plan have much greater 
financial wealth after controlling for a large set of other possible determinants of 
wealth accumulation (including income and many measures of traditional prefer-
ences). Finally, as noted, Reis (2006) shows that households with large costs of opti-
mization choose to be “inattentive savers” who follow a saving plan and optimally 
let consumption track income.20
Two questions were asked in the supplemental NCP survey to measure the impor-
tance of planning behavior for consumption smoothing. The first question mim-
ics the Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) question: “In the last few years, have 
you gathered together your household’s financial information, reviewed it in detail, 
and formulated a financial plan for your household’s long term future?” The sec-
ond question relates not to financial planning, but to planning as a trait in another 
sphere, in this case for vacation: “Before going on a vacation, how much time do 
you spend examining where you would most like to go and what you would like to 
do?” with possible answers: “A great deal of time,” “Quite a bit of time,” “A little 
time,” “Almost no time,” and “Do not go on vacation.” Households responding that 
they do not go on vacation are dropped from the analysis of this question.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that households that have made financial plans are 
much better at smoothing consumption than those that have not. First, note that there 
is a lot of variation in this question in this sample, with roughly half the households 
responding each way. Second, planning is highly correlated with liquidity. Panels B 
and C show that 79 percent of households that plan also have sufficient liquidity 
and 69 percent of households with sufficient liquidity plan. Panel A shows econom-
ically large differences in spending responses. For households that have formulated 
financial plans, the spending response is only borderline statistically significant and 
roughly a third as large as for those who have not planned. About three quarters of 
the total spending response in the sample is accounted for by households that do not 
make financial plans.
Finally, financial planning has some limited explanatory power beyond liquid-
ity (Table 6, panels B and C). Among households with liquidity, those that do not 
plan do not smooth spending. While pair-wise tests of the equality of responses 
are generally statistically insignificant, a test of equality of the average responses 
of planners equalling that of non-planners rejects equality in both panels B and C 
20 See also Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), and these results relate to those in both Agarwal et al. (2009), which 
shows a link between ability and financial mistakes, and Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011) which shows 
a positive relationship between IQ and stock-market participation. 
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with 95 percent (90 percent) confidence for both contemporaneous and four-week 
responses using all variation in timing of receipt (using only variation of timing 
within each means of disbursement).
Table 7 reports the results of the same analysis for vacation planning. Again, 
there is lots of variation in the sample, but time spent planning vacations is almost 
uncorrelated with liquidity. Across degrees of planning, moving across the columns, 
65 percent, 68 percent, and 67 percent have sufficient liquidity. The remainder of the 
table presents a statistically weak case that vacation planning matters for consump-
tion smoothing. In panel A, households that spend a great deal of time planning for 
vacations do not raise spending the week of arrival as much as the other households 
Table 6—Spending Responses by Liquidity and the Propensity to Plan Financially
Using all variation in 
time of receipt 
Using only variation 
in timing within each 
method of receipt
Formulated a financial plan 
for long-term future?: Yes No Yes No
Panel A. All households
Contemporaneous week 0.73 2.25 0.83 2.01
(0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.36)
t-statistic of difference 3.29 2.42
Four-week cumulative 1.81 5.76 1.72 4.71
(0.78) (0.90) (1.14) (1.18)
t-statistic of difference 3.33 1.82
Number of households 10,936 10,405 10,902 10,373
Panel B. Households with sufficient liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 0.27 1.19 0.38 1.11
(0.37) (0.46) (0.37) (0.49)
t-statistic of difference 1.58 1.19
Four-week cumulative 1.35 3.15 1.41 3.13
(0.90) (1.25) (1.32) (1.64)
t-statistic of difference 1.17 0.82
Number of households 8,598 5,087 8,578 5,076
Panel C. Households with low liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 2.03 3.10 2.06 2.72
(0.65) (0.48) (0.70) (0.52)
t-statistic of difference 1.33 0.76
Four-week cumulative 3.38 7.89 2.44 5.82
(1.60) (1.26) (2.24) (1.68)
t-statistic of difference 2.21 1.21
Number of households 2,338 5,318 2,324 5,297
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of an ESP in 
percent. The regressions in the first pair of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample and the second 
pair include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include household fixed effects 
and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households that report receipt 
during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, and meet the stan-
dard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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(statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level only). The point esti-
mates have the same pattern over the entire month, but the economic significance is 
smaller and larger standard errors preclude making any conclusion with confidence. 
Looking at households with different levels of liquidity, panel C shows that, among 
households with low liquidity, those who spend a great deal of time planning tend 
Table 7—Spending Responses by Liquidity and the Propensity to Plan Vacation
Using all variation in time of 
receipt 
Using only variation in timing 
within each method of receipt
Before going on vacation, 
how much time planning?:
A great 
deal 
of 
time
Quite a 
bit 
of 
time
A little 
time or 
almost 
no time
A great 
deal 
of 
time
Quite a 
bit 
of 
time
A little 
time or 
almost 
no time
Panel A. All households
Contemporaneous 0.66 1.57 1.87 0.50 1.49 1.79
 week (0.49) (0.38) (0.48) (0.50) (0.41) (0.48)
t-test of 1.76 1.86
 “A great deal…” = “A little…”
Four-week 2.90 3.24 3.98 2.00 3.05 3.01
 cumulative (1.21) (1.02) (1.19) (1.63) (1.51) (1.50)
t-test of 0.64 0.09
 “A great deal…” = “A little…”
Number of households 4,065 7,818 5,602 4,053 7,796 5,583
Panel B. Households with sufficient liquid wealth
Contemporaneous 0.00 0.66 1.03 0.01 0.79 0.99
 week (0.57) (0.44) (0.64) (0.59) (0.47) (0.60)
t-test of 1.20 1.17
 “A great deal…” = “A little…”
Four-week 2.08 1.40 2.12 1.63 2.24 1.65
 cumulative (1.52) (1.26) (1.38) (2.03) (1.92) (1.69)
t-test of 0.02 0.15
 “A great deal…” = “A little…”
Number of households 2,630 5,285 3,771 2,625 5,274 3,761
Panel C. Households with low liquid wealth
Contemporaneous 1.63 2.99 3.23 1.21 2.55 3.08
 week (0.84) (0.68) (0.73) (0.87) (0.74) (0.79)
t-test of 1.44 1.59
 “A great deal…” = “A little…”
Four-week 4.44 6.49 6.96 2.56 4.19 5.09
 cumulative (1.98) (1.70) (2.20) (2.70) (2.37) (2.88)
t-test of 0.85 0.02
 “A great deal…” = “A little…”
Number of households 1,435 2,533 1,831 1,428 2,522 1,822
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of an ESP 
in percent. The regressions in the first triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample and the 
second triplet include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include household fixed 
effects and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households that report 
receipt during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, and meet 
the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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to smooth spending better than others. There is no such difference for households 
with sufficient liquidity.
In sum, not only are the differences across vacation planners statistically weaker 
than the differences across financial planners, only 22 percent of households plan a lot 
and smooth consumption well. Forty-four percent of the sample spends “quite a bit 
of time” planning for vacations, and these households giving this “middle” response 
still show substantial spending responses similar to households that plan less.
The final variable dealing with sophistication is the extent to which households 
use deals, specials, or coupons when making NCP purchases. When households 
scan in individual purchased items, they are asked to input whether they used one 
of these discounts. For participating stores, this information is also provided by the 
store. I calculate the share of individual reported purchases that use deals, and split 
households evenly into those whose deal use is low and those whose deal use is high.
On the one hand, one might expect households that have fewer resources to spend 
more time on conserving them, suggesting that coupon use should be correlated 
with low liquidity and poor cunsumption smoothing. On the other hand, if house-
holds that use coupons plan—that is, spend more time and effort optimizing—then 
they may not only make better use of the resources that they have but also do a better 
job of inter-temporal optimization and thus of consumption smoothing.
Splitting the NCP sample into high and low coupon-use households (so that they 
are evenly split in panel A of Table 8), high coupon use has only a correlation of 
0.07 with liquidity. Among households with sufficient liquidity, slightly more use 
coupons (panel B), and among households with insufficient liquidity, slightly fewer 
use coupons (panel C). Panel A shows, however, that coupon use is economically 
significantly and statistically significantly related to spending responses at the one 
week horizon, with high coupon-use households smoothing spending better. At the 
one month horizon, the difference is statistically weaker, but the same pattern is 
present. Conditioning on liquidity, because it is largely uncorrelated with coupon 
use, does not change this ordering, but it also reduces the sample size used to esti-
mate each coefficient, and standard errors rise as a result.
In sum, I find that financial planning is correlated with consumption smoothing, 
as is coupon use. But the case for an important casual role for planning as a general 
trait, observable in spheres of activity other than finances, is weak.
D. Spenders, Savers, Self-Control, and Procrastination
This section shows first that households that self identify as the “type of house-
hold that lives for today and spends” have much larger spending response to the pay-
ment than households that identify as more patient. Second, there is an economically 
large but statistically weak higher propensity to spend on arrival among the small 
share of the population that frequently regrets past purchases. But this correlation 
does not explain much of the aggregate spending response; the other 95 percent of 
the population still exhibits substantial violations of consumption smoothing. Third, 
and also shedding light on the potential importance of self-control problems, larger 
delay in responding to the survey is not indicative of larger spending responses to 
arrival of the payment.
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A substantial literature has suggested that households can be modeled either as 
having heterogeneous impatience or as having heterogeneous behaviors with some 
standard life-cycle consumers and other households simply consuming their incomes 
(e.g., Campbell and Mankiw 1989, Krusell and Smith 1998). The NCP supplemental 
survey asked households to characterize themselves as spenders or savers: “In general, 
are you or other household members the sort of people who would rather spend your 
money and enjoy it today or save more for the future?” with a binary choice of “spend 
now” and “save for the future.” There is lots of variation in the responses, with two-
thirds of households reporting that they are the type to save for the future. Low liquid-
ity is significantly correlated with being a spender, a correlation of 0.31. Causation, 
Table 8—Spending Responses by Liquidity and Optimization: Deal Use
Using all variation in 
time of receipt 
Using only variation 
in timing within each 
method of receipt
Share of purchases made 
using coupons or deals: Low High Low High
Panel A. All households
Contemporaneous week 2.08 0.84 2.14 0.55
(0.34) (0.31) (0.36) (0.32)
t-stat of difference 2.71 3.30
Four-week 4.61 2.96 4.39 1.81
 cumulative increase (0.83) (0.85) (1.18) (1.12)
t-stat of difference 1.38 1.59
Number of households 10,666 10,663 10,631 10,632
Panel B. Households with sufficient liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 0.85 0.43 1.03 0.27
(0.44) (0.37) (0.45) (0.38)
t-stat of difference 0.72 1.29
Four-week 2.39 1.71 3.02 1.05
 cumulative increase (1.08) (0.99) (1.59) (1.29)
t-stat of difference 0.46 0.96
Number of households 6,172 7,506 6,156 7,491
Panel C. Households with low liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 3.49 1.57 3.39 1.07
(0.53) (0.54) (0.57) (0.59)
t-stat of difference 2.55 2.83
Four-week 7.24 5.34 5.81 3.31
 cumulative increase (1.30) (1.60) (1.75) (2.16)
t-stat of difference 0.92 0.90
Number of households 4,494 3,157 4,475 3,141
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP 
goods out of an ESP in percent. The regressions in the first pair of columns include fixed effects 
for each week in the sample and the second pair include fixed effects for each week for each 
means of receipt. All regressions include household fixed effects and are weighted by the NCP 
projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households that report receipt during the 
period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, and meet 
the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the 
Marketing Data Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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of course, could run in either direction, but the phrasing as the “type of people” was 
designed to avoid households simply responding based on current behavior.
Consistent with persistent differences in households, households that report being 
the type of people who spend and enjoy today have much larger spending response 
than those that report being the type who save. Table 9, panel A shows that the 
self-reported spending types exhibit large violations of consumption smoothing; the 
self-reported saving types smooth consumption the week of arrival but still show a 
statistically significant spending response over the month following arrival that is 
about half the size of the self-reported spending types. In the week of arrival, saving 
types have an economically small and statistically insignificant increase in  spending, 
spending types have a statistically significant and three times larger increase in 
Table 9—Spending Responses by Liquidity and Grasshoppers and Ants
Using all variation in 
time of receipt 
Using only variation 
in timing within each 
method of receipt
The sort of people who 
spend or save?:
Spend 
now
Save for 
future
Spend 
now
Save for 
future
Panel A. All households
Contemporaneous week 2.37 0.92 2.19 0.92
(0.39) (0.28) (0.43) (0.29)
t-stat of difference 3.00 2.46
Four-week 5.14 2.96 4.09 2.71
 cumulative increase (1.05) (0.71) (1.40) (1.00)
t-stat of difference 1.72 0.80
Number of households 7,881 13,460 7,852 13,423
Panel B. Households with sufficient liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 0.90 0.52 0.85 0.58
(0.55) (0.33) (0.59) (0.34)
t-stat of difference 0.59 0.39
Four-week 2.53 1.84 1.65 2.25
 cumulative increase (1.60) (0.81) (2.20) (1.14)
t-stat of difference 0.38 0.24
Number of households 3,528 10,157 3,522 10,132
Panel C. Households with low liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 3.36 1.92 3.05 1.74
(0.54) (0.54) (0.59) (0.57)
t-stat of difference 1.90 1.60
Four-week 7.01 5.92 5.60 3.64
 cumulative increase (1.39) (1.43) (1.82) (2.03)
t-stat of difference 0.55 0.72
Number of households 4,353 3,303 4,330 3,291
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP 
goods out of an ESP in percent. The regressions in the first pair of columns include fixed effects 
for each week in the sample and the second pair include fixed effects for each week for each 
means of receipt. All regressions include household fixed effects and are weighted by the NCP 
projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households that report receipt during the 
period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, and meet 
the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the 
Marketing Data Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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spending. Over a month, the cumulative spending of spending types is estimated to 
be double that of saving types, but this difference is not statistically significant.
Panel B and C of Table 9 show that this pattern continues to hold among house-
holds with low liquidity, but the only statistically significant (at the 90 percent 
level) differences are found for households with low liquidity the week the payment 
arrives. Among households with sufficient liquid wealth, there is little evidence of 
greater spending by households who characterize themselves as spenders.
Another possible reason for spending payments when they arrive is that some 
households have difficulty not spending liquidity. For example, one theory suggests 
that some households spend more of the payment on arrival than they would have 
chosen to had they been able to commit not to spend as much at an earlier time (see 
Angeletos et al. 2001, Gul and Pesendorfer 2004a,b). I investigate this proposition 
in two ways.
First, to investigate whether differences in the degree to which households per-
ceive their past spending to be suboptimal, households were asked, “Many people 
sometimes buy things that they later wish they had not bought. About how often do 
you or other household members make purchases that you later regret?” and house-
holds could answer: Often, Occasionally, Rarely, or Never. 
Panel A of Table 10 shows that there is significant variation in the population in 
response to this question. About 40 percent of households regret purchases often 
or occasionally, while 60 percent do so rarely or never. But the variation is almost 
unrelated to liquidity. And frequency of regret explains little of the differences in 
spending responses across households.
The contemporaneous response to the arrival of the payment is almost identical 
between households who often or occasionally regret purchases (columns 2 and 
5) and those who rarely/never do (columns 3 and 6). Columns 1 and 4 break out 
only those households who say that they often regret past purchases. Among this 
small set of households, the contemporaneous and cumulative spending responses 
are economically much larger, but the contemporaneous responses are only border-
line statistically significantly different from zero, and the cumulative responses are 
statistically even weaker.
Panels B and C show variation conditional on sufficient liquidity and low liquid-
ity. Panel C shows that there is no evidence for a role of regret in spending responses 
for households with low liquid wealth. However, in panel B, there is some evidence 
that households that rarely or never regret past purchases increase spending more in 
response to payment arrival than households that regret purchases more often. The 
estimates are economically large, but the small samples preclude confidence.
While this pattern is evidence against an important role for sophisticated models 
of self-control, or at least against the existence of a significant number of house-
holds who have not successfully managed their issues of self-control, this evidence 
may not be inconsistent with the existence of some households that are naïve about 
their self-control problems (Akerlof 1991, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). That is, 
if the primary source of variation were not problems of self-control, but instead the 
perceptions of them and therefore the wherewithal to manage them, then a response 
of never or rarely regretting would signal lack of understanding and lack of manage-
ment of self-control problems.
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As a second approach, I estimate whether the spending response is higher for 
households that delay responding to the supplemental survey, relative to house-
holds that respond rapidly. Households that delay response may have more prob-
lems of short-term self-control. Dividing the sample into three groups, whose 
responses to the survey were rapid, medium, and slow, reveals almost no correlation 
between delay in survey response and liquidity.21 Not only is there no evidence 
that  procrastination is associated with worse consumption smoothing, but there is 
21 A table with the regression results is contained in the unpublished Appendix. I divide households into rapid, 
medium, and slow responders depending on whether they respond the day of the survey, in days 1–7, or after 8 or 
more days for email surveys, and in the first 5 days, in days 6 to 12, and after 13 or more days for mail surveys. 
Table 10—Spending Responses by Liquidity and Self-Control: Regret of Purchases
About how often do you or
Using all variation in time  
of receipt 
Using only variation in timing 
within each method of receipt
other household members make  
purchases that you later regret?: Often
Often or 
occasionally
Rarely 
or never Often
Often or 
occasionally
Rarely 
or never
Panel A. All households
Contemporaneous week 2.80 1.10 1.81 3.64 0.92 1.80
(1.64) (0.34) (0.31) (1.99) (0.38) (0.33)
t-statistic of difference 1.53 1.77
Four-week cumulative 7.54 3.61 4.04 7.44 2.83 3.61
(4.83) (0.96) (0.76) (7.06) (1.29) (1.07)
t-statistic of difference 0.35 0.47
Number of households 481 8,426 12,915 479 8,399 12,876
Panel B. Households with sufficient liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 1.27 0.27 0.83 2.77 0.10 0.97
(2.77) (0.45) (0.37) (3.25) (0.49) (0.37)
t-statistic of difference 0.96 1.42
Four-week cumulative 10.80 3.29 1.37 9.81 2.64 1.78
(8.54) (1.27) (0.90) (12.40) (1.72) (1.28)
t-statistic of difference 1.23 0.40
Number of households 221 4,927 8,758 221 4,917 8,737
Panel C. Households with low liquid wealth
Contemporaneous week 4.17 2.02 3.49 4.40 1.77 3.24
(2.03) (0.52) (0.57) (2.61) (0.57) (0.62)
t-statistic of difference 1.91 1.75
Four-week cumulative 7.20 4.32 8.68 6.98 2.93 6.65
(5.82) (1.48) (1.38) (8.15) (1.97) (1.89)
t-statistic of difference 2.15 1.36
Number of households 260 3,499 4,157 258 3,482 4,139
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the propensity to consume NCP goods out of an ESP 
in percent. The regressions in the first triplet of columns include fixed effects for each week in the sample and the 
second triplet include fixed effects for each week for each means of receipt. All regressions include household fixed 
effects and are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Each sample includes only households that report 
receipt during the period of the experimental variation, sufficient ESP information for that specification, and meet 
the standard NCP static reporting requirement for the year. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data 
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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some statistically weak evidence that households who procrastinate responding to 
the survey have slightly lower spending responses. Among households with suffi-
cient liquidity, only those who respond to the survey in a middling amount of time 
spend a significant amount on arrival. Among households with low liquidity, there 
is no detectable pattern.
In sum, while there is statistically weak evidence that there is a small portion of 
the population with ex post perceived self-control problems who also have large 
spending responses to liquidity, there is no evidence that theories of hyperbolic dis-
counting or self-control explain a significant portion of the observed differences in 
spending responses in this natural experiment for the two measures studied here.
VII. Conclusion and Discussion of Results
This evidence has several implications for the modeling of consumption and sav-
ing behavior, summarized in Table 11.
This paper shows that household beliefs were not an important determinant of the 
month to month increase in household spending caused by the arrival of stimulus 
payments in 2008. The economic stimulus payments of 2008 were widely antici-
pated, and their arrival caused significant spending increases even among house-
holds anticipating the payments. 
The significant average response to the (largely expected) payments is almost 
entirely due to the behavior of the subpopulation of households that have low levels 
of liquidity, less than two months’ worth of income. Thus, on one level, the view 
that households smooth consumption across predictable changes in income subject 
only to the financial friction posed by a borrowing constraint receives significant 
support.
However, spending responses are persistent across years rather than being reflec-
tions only of transitory economics circumstances, such as moderate income shocks 
or temporal management of illiquid assets. Low income two-years prior to the pay-
ments is highly correlated with large spending responses to the payments. Income 
growth, although not measured precisely, explains almost none of the variation in 
spending response. 
While this persistence could be due to budget constraints, say through means-
tested assistance programs, I also find that a number of behaviors and measures of 
household type are important explanators of which households smooth spending 
across the arrival of liquidity. Arrival causes larger spending responses for the type 
of households that live for today, for those households having made a financial plan 
in the last two years, and for households using more coupons or deals when making 
purchases. Statically weak, arrival also causes  somewhat larger spending for house-
holds that are disappointed in their payment amount, for households that do not plan 
for vacations, as well as for the small share of people who often regret past purchases.
A buffer-stock or liquidity-management model in which some households are 
highly impatient would match the evidence of large spending responses among 
households with low liquidity as identified by the saver-spender distinction. And 
costly investment in skills could further match the relationship between impatience 
and low labor income (e.g., more impatient households invest in less education). But 
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other evidence suggests a role for sophistication or planning, which could poten-
tially be a result of low liquidity or impatience.
Alternatively, low levels of economic sophistication or high costs of optimiza-
tion may cause both low levels of liquid wealth and poor consumption smoothing. 
Low ability or economic sophistication is a persistent characteristic, and can cause 
both poor economic outcomes like wealth, income, and consumption volatility and 
outcomes like lack of planning, lack of coupon use, and little understanding of pay-
ment programs like the stimulus program. In this view, high-spending responses to 
predictable income and lack of planning, being a “spender,” etc., are all symptoms 
of low levels of sophistication, for want of a better term.
Table 11—Summary of Findings and Conjectures on Implications
If correlated with 
low liquidity
Independent 
channel
Correlated 
with a higher 
propensity to 
spend?
Correlation 
with low 
liquidity
Explanation 
under textbook 
buffer-stock 
theory
Alternative 
explanation 
of spending 
response
Is there 
correlation 
conditional on 
liquidity?
Factor
Decrease in income No
 (poorly measured)
Less than median
 income (2006)
Yes 0.13 Means-testing 
or impatience
Ability to earn 
and smooth
Yes, 
channel-like 
sophistication, 
ability
Positive news on No −0.01 No
 arrival
Unexpected or
 less than expected
Yes, insignif. 0.08 Possibly, 
channel-like 
sophistication
Lack of financial
 planning
Yes 0.31 Low wealth 
implies little 
need to plan
Planning 
causes saving, 
smoothing
Yes, but not 
statistically 
strong
Little/no vacation
 planning
Weak, week 
of arrival only
−0.01
Low use of
 specials, deals
Yes, week of 
arrival only
0.13 Poor have 
little time
Optimization 
over goods 
and time
Yes, only 
week of 
arrival, low 
liquidity 
Spender household Yes 0.31 Impatience 
causes low 
liquidity
Some 
households are 
hand-to-mouth
Yes, only 
week of 
arrival, low 
liquidity 
Often regret
 purchases
Yes, 
insignificant
0.06 5 percent of 
households 
lack 
self-control
Procrastination of No −0.03
 survey
Notes: Each variable is defined as a binary variable so that correlations are comparable. Low income is defined as 
less than the median income. “Yes, insignificant” indicates effects that are behaviorally important but statistically 
insignificant.
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